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The latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the D.S.M.-5, 
was published in May 2013. In the lead up to publication, radical changes to the classification 
were anticipated; there was widespread dissatisfaction with the previous edition and it was 
accepted that a “paradigm shift” was required. In the end, however, and despite huge efforts 
at revision, the published D.S.M.-5 differs very little from its predecessor.  This paper 
considers why it is that revising the D.S.M. has become so difficult. The D.S.M. is such an 
important classification that this question is worth asking in its own right. The case of the 
D.S.M. can also serve as a study for considering stasis in classification more broadly; why 
and how can classifications become resistant to change? I suggest that classifications like the 
D.S.M. can be thought of as forming part of the infrastructure of science, and have much in 
common with material infrastructure. In particular, as with material technologies, it is 
possible for “path dependent” development to cause a sub-optimal classification to become 
“locked in” and hard to replace. 
 
Highlights: 
 Despite commitment to radical revision, D.S.M.-5 differs little from its predecessor. 
 As the D.S.M.-5 is agreed to be sub-optimal this will hold back research. 
 Path-dependence has led to the classification becoming “locked-in”. 














The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (more commonly known as the 
D.S.M.) is a classification of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric 
Association (A.P.A.). The D.S.M. is hugely influential and used throughout the world. The 
latest edition, D.S.M.-5, was published in May 2013. In the lead up to publication, radical 
changes to the classification were anticipated; there was widespread dissatisfaction with the 
previous edition and the A.P.A. had acknowledged that a “paradigm shift” might be required 
(Kupfer et al, 2002, p.xix). In the end, however, and despite huge efforts at revision, the 
published D.S.M.-5 differs very little from its predecessor.  This paper considers why it is 
that revising the D.S.M. has become so difficult. The D.S.M. is such an important 
classification that this question is worth addressing in its own right. The case of the D.S.M. 
can also serve as a study for considering stasis in classification more broadly; why and how 
can classifications become resistant to change? 
 
In Sorting Things Out (2000),  Bowker and Star argue that classifications can be thought of as 
part of the information infrastructure of science, and have features in common with material 
infrastructure, like electricity supply networks. They suggest that as with material 
technologies, it is possible for “path dependent” development to cause a sub-optimal 
classification to become “locked in” and hard to replace (Bowker and Star, 2000, p.14). 
Drawing on this suggestion, I will show that the D.S.M. has come to suffer from “lock-in”, 
and that more generally widely-used classification systems are prone to lock-in. I finish by 
discussing the problems that lock-in causes and consider the prospects for lock-in being 
overcome (in particular by a new classification for mental health research, RDoC, currently 
being developed by the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health). 
 
1. The D.S.M. in use and under revision 
 
The D.S.M. is a large and expensive book that provides diagnostic criteria for each 
commonly seen psychiatric disorder.  Alcohol Intoxication, for example, is to be diagnosed 
when a certain number of characteristic symptoms (slurred speech, unsteady gait, impairment 
in attention or memory, and so on) follow “recent ingestion of alcohol” (A.P.A., 2013, 
p.497). For Persistent Depressive Disorder symptoms can include problems with appetite and 
sleep, fatigue, low self-esteem, poor concentration, and feelings of hopelessness (A.P.A., 
2013, p.168-9).  
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The D.S.M. provides a common language for mental health research, policy and care. Almost 
all papers published in psychiatric journals refer to the D.S.M.; the use of D.S.M. categories 
to select subject populations for study is near universal. Worldwide, textbooks for mental 
health professionals, and treatment guidelines, tend to be structured around D.S.M. 
categories. In the U.S., the D.S.M. also plays an important bureaucratic and economic role; in 
particular, the D.S.M. contains the codes that insurers commonly require before paying for 
mental health treatment.  
Although currently widely used, the D.S.M. has only become important relatively recently 
(Cooper 2005, Decker 2013, Shorter 2013). The earliest editions of the D.S.M., published in 
1952 and 1968 were slim, cheap, and little read. The D.S.M. series only came to global 
prominence with the publication of D.S.M.-III in 1980. The D.S.M.-III was a big book, with 
diagnostic categories suited to patients seen in counsellors’ offices as well as in mental 
hospitals. In the U.S., the disorder codes included in the D.S.M. came to be used in filling in 
the forms for claiming medical insurance, and sales of the classification took off. Since the 
D.S.M.-III, each later edition, D.S.M.-III-R in 1987, D.S.M.-IV in 1994, D.S.M.-IV-TR in 
2000 (with the “R” standing for “revision” and the “TR” for “text revision”) - further helped 
to consolidate the system’s position as the most important classification of mental disorders.1  
Work on the D.S.M.-5 took twelve years and involved many hundreds of people (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.5). In 1999, an initial conference, published as A Research 
                                                            
1 The D.S.M.-IV-TR (2000) was only a “text revision”, that is the sets of diagnostic criteria remained the same 
as in the D.S.M.-IV (with a very few exceptions), and only the accompanying text was revised.  
 
The World Health Organisation (W.H.O.) publishes the International Classification of Disorders (I.C.D.), 
which supplies codes for official health statistics for the whole of medicine. The I.C.D. includes a chapter 
dedicated to “Mental and Behavioural Disorders”. However, at present, after much work on alignment by the 
A.P.A. and the W.H.O., the I.C.D. and D.S.M. can scarcely count as independent classifications of mental 
disorders.  The mental disorders section of the forthcoming I.C.D.-11 is expected to be much the same as the 
D.S.M.-5. A statement from the A.P.A. explains the relationship between the two classifications: “DSM-5 and 
the ICD should be thought of as companion publications. DSM-5 contains the most up-to-date criteria for 
diagnosing mental disorders, along with extensive descriptive text, providing a common language for clinicians 
to communicate about their patients. The ICD contains the code numbers used in DSM-5 and all of medicine, 
needed for insurance reimbursement and for monitoring of morbidity and mortality statistics by national and 
international health agencies. The APA works closely with staff from the WHO, CMS, and CDC-NCHS to 
ensure that the two systems are maximally compatible.” (A.P.A., 2013b) 
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Agenda for D.S.M.-V (the Latin numerals only changed later) (Kupfer et al., 2002), set out the  
hopes for D.S.M. revision. A Research Agenda begins by detailing problems with the D.S.M. 
series to date. It notes that the D.S.M.-IV fails to neatly classify patients – rather than each 
patient fitting one category, a great number fit multiple categories (the problem of co-
morbidity) or none (and have to be given a “diagnosis” of “Not Otherwise Specified”).  
Furthermore, research projects aiming to find the biological mechanisms underpinning 
disorder have achieved little; genes for schizophrenia, or anything else, remain elusive. A 
Research Agenda concludes that this lack of progress may indicate that the D.S.M.-IV fails to 
divide up the domain of mental disorders in the way that would best promote science; rather 
than circumscribing natural kinds, the diagnostic criteria of the D.S.M.-IV might merely 
arbitrarily group certain patients together.   
A Research Agenda traces the root of the problem to the descriptive approach to classification 
adopted by the D.S.M.-III. When the D.S.M.-III was under development, in the late seventies, 
psychoanalysis remained an important perspective in U.S. psychiatry, and psychoanalytically 
and biologically-inclined psychiatrists could reach agreement on little. To keep all parties on 
board, the D.S.M.-III sought to be a purely descriptive classification that made no use of 
unproven theoretical assumptions (A.P.A., 1980, pp.6-8). The descriptive syndromes of the 
D.S.M.-III were selected primarily to ensure reliability (i.e. agreement between diagnosing 
clinicians) rather than validity (i.e fit with the natural structure of mental disorders). The 
thought at the time was that a classification that could at least be reliably applied would 
enable research that would allow the categories to be revised over time to better reflect the 
nature of mental disorders. But now biologically-orientated researchers wondered whether 
the descriptive approach of the D.S.M.-III might have outlived its usefulness, and whether 
important commonalities between cases of disorder might not be apparent at the level of 
surface symptoms. Maybe only a classification based on common causal origins would 
enable progress in mental health research. A key theme of A Research Agenda is that the 
descriptive syndromes included in the D.S.M. have now become so embedded in psychiatric 
research as to be potentially problematic. It increasingly seems likely that some theoretically 
interesting populations do not map on to D.S.M. categories, and such groups are currently 
under-researched. If, for example, some sub-group of those with a particular D.S.M. 
diagnosis share a genetic abnormality, or a drug can help a population that cuts across current 
categories, this is likely to be missed by current investigations. In a Research Agenda there is 
much talk of the need for paradigm change, and plans are set out for moving towards more 
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biologically-based and more dimensional approaches to classifying psychopathology.   
Work on drafting the D.S.M.-5 began in earnest in 2006. As publishers of the D.S.M., the 
A.P.A. controls the revision process (detailed in A.P.A., 2013, Introduction). A Task Force of 
twenty-eight, chaired by David Kupfer, was appointed to oversee the project.  Each section of 
the manual - mood disorders, childhood disorders, and so on –was reviewed by an associated 
work group of about ten experts. Members of the work groups reviewed the literature 
published since the publication of D.S.M.-IV and considered where the classification might 
be in need of updating. They presented their ideas in papers and at conferences to gather 
feedback. Draft proposals for changes to the D.S.M. diagnostic criteria were posted online, 
and all were invited to comment. Some of the new diagnostic criteria sets were tested in field 
trials, where clinicians used the draft criteria to check that they could be understood and used 
in practice. Behind the scenes, groups of patients and clinicians, and others with interests in 
the D.S.M., lobbied the A.P.A. in attempts to shape the classification. Finally, before 
publication, the D.S.M. had to be voted through by various A.P.A committees. 
Although the committees revising the D.S.M. started out with ambitions for radical changes, 
over time, one-by-one, the more radical suggestions for overhaul were dropped.  David 
Kupfer who chaired the Task Force to revise the D.S.M.-5 describes it as “an aggressive, 
conservative document”, in his view the committees were aggressive in their pursuit of 
revision, but conservative in their decisions in the end (Levine, 2013). In its finally published 
form the D.S.M.-5 differs from its predecessor much less than originally envisaged; a few 
disorders have been added, a few disorders have been removed, diagnostic criteria have been 
tweaked here and there.  This paper examines why the D.S.M. proved so difficult to change. 
How is that a revision process that cost $25 million (Frances, 2013, p.175), and that involved 
so much work by so many experts, achieved so little?  How could the A.P.A. set out to make 
changes, and yet fail to change its own manual?  
At the outset it is worth acknowledging that the reasons why proposed revisions didn’t make 
it to the final version are multiple.  It’s always to be expected that many proposals will 
flounder as their details are worked out; many ideas that look good in outline run into 
difficulties when developed further. In addition, there have been suggestions that the revision 
process was mismanaged (Frances, 2013; Greenberg, 2013). Although much money and 
effort was spent, important deadlines were repeatedly missed, internal politics may have 
resulted in key experts being excluded from the process, and some committee members have 
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suggested that they suffered from a lack of direction.  Whether allegations that the revision 
process was poorly managed are justified is hard to assess; the nitty-gritty details of the ways 
in which the D.S.M.-5 was constructed are at present known only to committee members, and 
they have signed agreements not to discuss their efforts (Board of Trustees, 2007).  In any 
case, here I suggest that a more fundamental, general explanation of why the D.S.M. is now 
hard to revise can be found, through employing the concepts of “path dependence” and “lock-
in”. 
 
2. “Path dependence” and “lock-in” 
 
The QWERTY keyboard layout offers the classic example of path dependence leading to 
lock-in (David, 1985). In the days of mechanical typewriters, the QWERTY layout was 
designed to reduce the chances of keys jamming together; the design minimises the frequency 
with which physically adjacent keys are used one after the other. Modern keyboards no 
longer jam, and so it may well be the case that a different layout would be preferable. Many 
argue that an alternative layout, Dvorak, would enable faster typing. Still, the costs of shifting 
from one layout to another are too great for QWERTY to now be displaced. Everyone finds it 
easier to type on keyboards that have a familiar layout, and so everyone buys QWERTY 
keyboards. The QWERTY design has become locked-in. 
 
The QWERTY example is somewhat controversial (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990, contest 
the supposed superiority of Dvorak), but will still serve to illustrate the idea that certain 
technologies are path dependent, and can become locked-in to suboptimal design. The 
phenomenon arises as follows:  At an initial time a particular technology comes to be adopted 
either because it has some temporary advantage over competitors, or through chance factors. 
The technology is such that success breeds success, such that, at some later point, the adopted 
technology becomes very hard to dislodge. Path dependence, potentially leading to lock-in, 
can occur whenever a technology is such that positive feedback mechanisms ensure that its 
greater use brings ever greater returns. The QWERTY keyboard layout manifests path 
dependence because the more used typists become to working with a particular layout the 




Another classic example of path dependence leading to lock-in illustrates the effects of a 
different type of positive feedback mechanism.
2
 When home video players were first 
developed V.H.S. quickly came to be the preferred format (Arthur, 1990). Arguably a 
different technology, Betamax, would have been better, but once V.H.S. was in widespread 
use it could not be dislodged. With a technology of this type it is an advantage for each 
individual user to employ a format that is widely used by others. One needs videos to play in 
video-recorders, and more videos are available (from friends, from hire shops) in the most 
used format. As such, once a large number of people use a particular option, new buyers will 
also choose this. One way in which path dependence can occur is when technologies are tied 
in with supporting infrastructures, such that an individual cannot simply choose to switch to a 
competitor.   
 
As the V.H.S.-Betamax example makes clear, lock-in is not an absolute matter. The 
dominance of V.H.S. did not last, nowadays the technology is near-obsolete, and D.V.D.s or 
downloaded films have become the norm. Lock-in is a time-dependent and agent-relative 
matter. New technology or social changes can make it the case that a technology that is 
locked-in now might not be in the future. Take the QWERTY keyboard. Suppose that voice 
recognition software becomes the norm such that typing becomes a much rarer activity. In 
such a world, where no-one can touch type in any case, customers might become willing to 
buy an alternative keyboard layout. It’s also the case that what’s impossible for one agent, 
may be possible for another.  In the U.K., we drive on the left. From the point of view of an 
individual driver going against this norm is impossible. But from the point of view of the 
government, driving on the left is a convention that might be revised; although switching has 
great costs, other countries have switched from left to right hand driving.  
 
In the following section I shall suggest that the D.S.M. has become locked-in in two senses. 
First, it’s become very difficult for any other professional body comparable to the A.P.A. (the 
American Psychological Association, say, or national organisations of social workers or 
counsellors) to produce a competitor to the D.S.M. Second, the D.S.M. has become locked-in 
such that it’s become very difficult even for the A.P.A., its publishers, to radically revise it.  
 
                                                            
2 Other case studies of lock-in have examined the design of British rail coal wagons (Scott, 2001), electric 
vehicles (Cowan and Hultén, 1996), nuclear reactors (Cowan, 1990), and the Korean alphabet (Choi, 2008). 
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3. Path dependence, lock-in and the D.S.M. – in outline 
 
3.1. How  the A.P.A.’s past success in publishing the D.S.M. facilitates future success  
In the late 1970s, when work started on D.S.M.-III, few people were interested in 
classification in mental health (Decker, 2013). The lack of general interest enabled a small 
group of like-minded researchers to gain control of the revisionary process. These 
researchers, dubbed the “neo-Kraepelians” by Blashfield (1984), shared a particular outlook. 
They believed that diagnosis and classification mattered, that diagnostic criteria should be 
operationalised to achieve reliability, and that mental disorders would prove to be 
biologically-based medical disorders. 
Subsequent to publication, the success of the D.S.M.-III took most by surprise (Decker, 
2013). Crucially, the classification launched at a time when it was becoming the norm for 
mental health services to be paid for by insurance, and for insurers to demand a diagnosis. 
While insurance for mental health care was rare in the U.S. when the D.S.M.-I was published 
in 1952, coverage gradually increased throughout the sixties and seventies, and had become 
widespread by 1980 (Cooper, 2005, pp.127-132). The D.S.M. contains the codes used to fill 
in insurance forms. These codes are drawn from the version of the I.C.D. (the classification 
of disorders published by the W.H.O.) that is used in the U.S.  Although these codes can be 
obtained without buying the D.S.M., the D.S.M. contains them in a user-friendly format, and 
most mental health professionals in the U.S. access the codes via the D.S.M. This is the main 
reason that mental health professionals of all types (not just psychiatrists, but also 
psychologists, social workers, and counsellors) buy and use the D.S.M. (Miller et al., 1981, 
Kutchins and Kirk 1988, Frazer et al. 2002).  
During the same period, the testing, regulation, and marketing of psychoactive drugs came to 
see them as directed at specific disorders, as opposed to symptoms (Cooper, 2005, pp.112-
118; Shorter, 2013, p.13). Researchers came to use D.S.M.-III diagnostic criteria to pick out 
subject populations for research; the F.D.A. demanded the use of D.S.M. categories in drug 
trials
3
; advertising started to employ the idea that psychoactive drugs treat specific 
                                                            
3 Shorter, 2013, p13 cites Paul Leber, head of neuropharmacology at FDA speaking in November 1980, “The 
diagnostic system of choice is DSM-III. You may use another one. However, a DSM-III classification of every 
patient is required” (US Food and Drug Administration (Silver Spring, MD), Psychopharmacologic Drugs 
Advisory Committee, 18th meeting, 1980 Nov 6, p.162; obtained through the Freedom of Information Act).  
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conditions. Such activities helped legitimise the notion that the descriptions included in the 
D.S.M.-III were scientifically respectable and referred to real disorders. The net result was 
that the D.S.M.-III classification came to be much more widely used and more respected than 
its predecessors. 
The successes of the D.S.M.-III left the A.P.A. in a much better position to construct 
successor classifications than any comparable organisations (such as the American 
Psychological Association, say, or national organisations of social workers or counsellors). 
Sales of the D.S.M.-III brought in $9.33 million (Blashfield et al., 2014, p.32), some of which 
the A.P.A. was able to reinvest in producing the next edition, D.S.M.-III-R. In its turn, the 
D.S.M.-III-R earned $16.65 million (Blashfield et al., 2014, p.32), of which $5 million was 
then spent on producing the D.S.M.-IV (Frances, 2013, p.175).  This investment again 
yielded good returns, and between 2005 and 2011 the A.P.A. earned $5-6 million each year 
from sales of the D.S.M.-IV (Treasurer, 2012). Each revision of the D.S.M. costs more and 
more to produce; the D.S.M.-5 cost $25 million. The A.P.A. is able to invest so much in the 
D.S.M. because it is confident that sales of each new edition will bring in a profit.  The sums 
of money involved make producing a competitor classification far beyond the reach of most 
organisations.  
In addition, over time, the A.P.A. has built up the sorts of bureaucratic structures, expertise, 
and ways of working that enable it to produce the D.S.M. Revising the D.S.M. now involves 
multiple committees working for years. The experts who work to revise the D.S.M. are 
mostly unpaid. The reason that experts are prepared to help with the D.S.M. is because they 
have good reason to trust that the D.S.M. will be a successful, influential classification 
system.  Those who play key roles in revising one edition of the D.S.M. tend to have served 
lesser roles in revising earlier editions. The A.P.A. has a deliberate strategy of including 
younger experts in revising the D.S.M., with the expectation that this will enable them to 
build skills that will enable them to better contribute to revising later editions (no author, 
1988).
 4
  The end result is that today the A.P.A. has built up enviable in-house expertise, and 
can also call on internationally renowned out-of-house experts, to work on producing the 
D.S.M.  
                                                            
4 This note in the APA archives titled “Principles of Workgroup Membership Selection” details a number of 
desiderata for workgroup membership. Ideally each should include one ‘younger generation type’ (defined as 
someone under 40)  to develop experience for DSM-V and VI. 
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The money, skills, and networks that the A.P.A. has built up over time mean that the A.P.A. 
now has a huge advantage over other national professional organisations that might attempt 
to produce classifications of mental disorder.  
3.2 How it became hard for the A.P.A. to radically change the D.S.M. 
The second way in which the D.S.M. has become locked-in is perhaps more interesting. The 
D.S.M. has become locked-in such that it has become very difficult for the A.P.A. to produce 
a classification that differs much from earlier editions of the D.S.M. This has come about for 
several reasons: 
First, it has become commonplace for D.S.M. categories to be employed in mental health 
research. This means that when it comes to revising the classification there is a substantial 
body of work available that can inform considerations as to whether particular categories 
should be revised. The advantage that this provides became apparent relatively early on. 
Those producing the D.S.M.-III-R (1987), many of whom had also been involved in 
constructing the D.S.M.-III (1980), noted that the build-up in research made their job far 
easier than their predecessors. 
The Work Group to Revise D.S.M.-III and its advisory committees had far more 
data about the diagnostic categories than did the Task Force that developed 
D.S.M.-III. The groups that develop D.S.M.-IV should have even more data as 
the basis for their deliberations. Therefore, the prospects for the future, and for 
the D.S.M.-IV in particular, are bright. (A.P.A., 1987, p.xxvii)  
The available research is directed at D.S.M. categories, and thus evidence becomes 
available to guide tweaking D.S.M.-categories. Studies may well show that an extra 
symptom should be added to the diagnostic criteria for a particular disorder, that a 
diagnosis could usefully be split into subtypes, or that two diagnoses should be merged 
together. However, finding research that might inform shifting to a radically different 
type of classification system is very difficult. Almost everyone uses the D.S.M., and so 
such research is not done.  
Second, as the D.S.M. has become ever more important, it’s become tied to networks of other 
classifications and bureaucratic structures. Consider, for example, the complex links between 
the D.S.M. and insurance. It is  important for A.P.A. revenues that  the codes included in the 
D.S.M. be acceptable to insurance providers because the main reason that clinicians buy the 
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D.S.M. is for the codes. Making the D.S.M. insurance-friendly is a complex undertaking. The 
U.S. is bound by international treaty to use a version of the I.C.D., the classification produced 
by the World Health Organisation, for official medical coding. The U.S. Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (1996) also requires the use of I.C.D. codes. As such, the 
D.S.M. needs to maintain compatibility with the I.C.D. so that it contains codes that are 
acceptable to insurance companies. But this isn’t the end of the problem. Rather than 
employing the I.C.D. in the form published by the W.H.O., the U.S. uses a “clinical 
modification” developed especially for use in the U.S., and development of the U.S. 
modifications lags years behind the revision schedule of the I.C.D.  At time of writing, the 
U.S. is one of the last countries on earth still to be using a version of I.C.D.-9 (even though 
the I.C.D.-10 was published in 1990). The reason that the U.S. has been so slow to move to 
the newer version of the I.C.D. is that the systems used in funding U.S. healthcare are so 
complex, and split between so many different powerful service providers, that forcing 
through changes to the codes on which they depend has become a monstrous (and hugely 
expensive) undertaking (Reed, 2010). Still, though much delayed, a clinical modification of 
I.C.D.-10 is under development and is due to come into use in 2015. As a result, 
D.S.M.-5 contains both I.C.D.-9-C.M. codes for immediate use and I.C.D.-10-
C.M. codes in parentheses. The inclusion of I.C.D.-10- C.M. codes facilitates a 
cross-walk to the new coding system that will be implemented on October 1, 
2014 for all U.S. health care providers and systems [implementation has since 
been put back to 2015], as recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s National Center for Health Statistics (C.D.C.-N.C.H.S.) and the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (C.M.S.). (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013b., p.1) 
However, while the U.S. is only just moving to using I.C.D.-10, the rest of the world has 
moved on, and a new version of the I.C.D., I.C.D.-11 is due to be published by W.H.O. in 
2015. Maintaining compatibility with this new version of I.C.D. is also essential if the A.P.A. 
to ensure long-term use of the D.S.M. The upshot is that the financial success of the D.S.M. 
depends on there being fairly direct translations between D.S.M.-5  disorders and codes in 
three different I.C.D. systems (I.C.D.-9-C.M., I.C.D.-10-C.M., and I.C.D.-11).This effort 
relies on the A.P.A. working “closely with staff from the W.H.O., C.M.S., and C.D.C.-
N.C.H.S. to ensure that the two systems are maximally compatible” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013b, p.1). 
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In order to maintain compatibility with the I.C.D., when changing the D.S.M., the A.P.A. 
consults with the W.H.O. The users and purposes of the I.C.D. differ from those of the 
D.S.M. (Reed, 2010). As such, there is no guarantee that changes that would promote the 
interests of the A.P.A. will also satisfy the needs of the W.H.O. Although used around the 
world, the D.S.M. is primarily directed at clinicians and researchers working in the U.S. In 
contrast, the I.C.D. is specifically designed for international use. The I.C.D. comes in various 
versions. While the most complex is intended for use by researchers, two simplifications of 
this are produced, one for specialist clinicians, and one for use in primary care settings. 
Crucially all three versions of the I.C.D. are intended to be compatible, and the W.H.O. is 
committed to ensuring that the primary care version is suitable for use by non-specialist 
clinicians working in developing countries. This commitment constrains the possibilities for 
revising the I.C.D.  
The need to maintain compatibility with the I.C.D., and to maintain acceptability by the 
insurance industry, creates complex constraints on the ways in which the D.S.M. can be 
revised. Furthermore, the I.C.D.-insurance-industry network is not the only network in which 
the D.S.M. is embedded. In the U.S., D.S.M. categories have been adopted by numerous 
government organisations. The D.S.M. affects everything from the ways in which school 
children with special needs receive services to the laws governing the detention of sex 
offenders. Any revision can thus have huge ramifications. 
 
4. Specific examples of lock-in and the D.S.M.  
 
Here I focus on two proposals that in the end could not be implemented, or at least not 
implemented fully. The first, comparatively small-scale, concerns revisions to autistic 
spectrum disorders. The other concerns the proposal to develop a dimensional classification 
for the personality disorders. Considering these two examples in some detail will make it 






4.1. Asperger’s disorder; the diagnosis that couldn’t be taken back 
 
Asperger’s disorder was first included in the D.S.M. in D.S.M.-IV (1994). Here it is listed 
separately from autism, but is thought to be a related, though typically milder, disorder. When 
draft diagnostic criteria for the D.S.M.-5 were posted on the A.P.A. website in 2010 it 
became public that Asperger’s disorder was to be removed as a standalone diagnosis.5 The 
Work Group justified the proposed revision on the grounds that the D.S.M.-IV distinctions 
between autism, Asperger’s and P.D.D.-N.O.S. (pervasive developmental disorder – not 
otherwise specified) could not be reliably drawn (Happé, 2011).  They thus proposed doing 
away with the distinctions employed in the D.S.M.-IV. Instead, a new category, autistic 
spectrum disorder (A.S.D.), would include almost all of those previously diagnosed with 
autism, as well as most of those previously diagnosed with Asperger’s disorder (as well as 
some other autism-related D.S.M.-IV conditions). 
As soon as the proposed changes were announced they became controversial. A key worry 
concerned how the changes to the D.S.M. might affect overall prevalence rates of autism-
related conditions (i.e. the D.S.M.-IV autism-like disorders lumped together versus new 
A.S.D.). Traditionally, and in the D.S.M.-IV, the key difference between children with autism 
and with Asperger’s was that those with Asperger’s showed no significant delays in early 
language skills, while those with autism developed language late, if at all. In merging the 
disorders, in D.S.M.-5 the criteria relating to problems with language development, 
previously included in the D.S.M.-IV as symptoms of autism, were removed. Other changes 
in diagnostic criteria were also made, for example, in the age by which symptoms must be 
manifest. The multiple differences between D.S.M.-IV and D.S.M.-5 made it hard to be sure 
whether a larger or smaller group of people could be expected to meet the new criteria. 
Based on analyses using draft D.S.M.-5 criteria, a number of studies predicted that a 
significant number of those diagnosed under D.S.M.-IV would no longer be diagnosed 
(Mattila et al., 2011; Matson,  et al., 2012;Dickerson  et al., 2013). Prevalence rates matter 
hugely, particularly in the case of conditions such as autism-related disorders where costly 
therapies are indicated. As legal systems and bureaucracies use D.S.M. categories to 
                                                            
5
 The webpage that hosted proposed revisions while the D.S.M.-5 was under development has since been taken 
down by the A.P.A. (although it can still be accessed via The “Wayback Machine- Internet Archive” by 
searching for  http://dsm5.org) 
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determine eligibility for services, the loss of a diagnosis can mean that the child risks losing 
educational and therapeutic services.  
Patient and family support groups for those affected by autism-related conditions are well 
informed, and well organised, and were alert to the potential ramifications of changes to 
D.S.M. criteria on service provision.  Autism groups came together to voice concerns that 
some of those with D.S.M.-IV autism-related diagnoses might not be diagnosed under 
D.S.M.-5. Petitions argued that broad definitions of A.S.D. should be maintained, and 
advocates organised for the A.P.A. to be bombarded with emails and phone calls protesting 
the proposed changes (Greenberg, 2013, pp.296-299). In the run up to publication of D.S.M.-
5, a number of States also passed legislation stating that regardless of any changes to the 
D.S.M., all those diagnosed with Asperger’s under D.S.M.-IV should remain eligible for 
insurance-coverage for their treatment (Connecticut General Assembly, 2013; Illinois 
General Assembly, 2013)  
In the end, the A.P.A. compromised. In the published D.S.M.-5, Asperger’s disorder has been 
deleted, and the diagnostic criteria for autistic spectrum disorder (slightly modified from 
those initially proposed) have been included.  However following the new criteria, a note 
states that, 
Individuals with a well-established D.S.M.-IV diagnosis of autistic disorder, 
Asperger’s disorder, or pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified 
should be given the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder. (A.P.A., 2013, p.51).  
This note is extraordinary, and unprecedented in the D.S.M. Given that there are clear 
differences between the old diagnostic criteria and the new, the claim that historical 
diagnoses can be maintained  is most plausibly understood as aiming to retain services for 
those diagnosed under the D.S.M.-IV.  
This move has not been enough to appease some autism advocacy groups, who are concerned 
not just to maintain services for those diagnosed under D.S.M.-IV, but also to ensure the 
provision of services for those diagnosed in the future. In 2013, in New York, Senate Bill 
3044-A was proposed by Senator Carlucci (State of New York, 2013). This aims to write the 
D.S.M.-IV definitions of autism and Asperger’s disorder into State Legislation on insurance 
coverage. The intent is to ensure that in New York D.S.M.-IV definitions as opposed to 
D.S.M.-5 definitions will determine eligibility for services. At time of writing this bill is still 
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making its way through the legislative process. The bill is supported by some autism 
advocacy groups: 
We haven’t fought all these years for access to health insurance and services for 
people with autism to allow a committee of “experts” to define away our hard 
won gains….the legislature said loud and clear that they will not let the American 
Psychiatric Association dictate who gets care for autism in New York (Autism 
Action Network, 2013) 
On the other side of the debate, the act is opposed by the New York State Psychiatric 
Association, who emailed members to ask them to lobby and oppose the bill. In the view of 
the N.Y.S.P.A., 
The proponents of the legislation seek to freeze the definition of autism because 
they are fearful that the new definitions in D.S.M.-5 may diminish or eliminate 
eligibility for special education services in schools and/or health insurance 
coverage for community services. This is simply not true and would an improper 
intrusion of the Legislature into the realm of medical science. Medical 
professionals must have the ability to update and revise clinical diagnoses 
according to new scientific evidence and advances in medicine. (reported by 
PsychPractice Blog, 2013) 
Here we have a case where a diagnosis, first introduced by the A.P.A. only in 1994, has 
since then become so entrenched that twenty years later it has become difficult for the 
A.P.A. to delete it from the manual. As a diagnosis, Asperger’s has worked to unite a 
community of service users. Battles have been fought and won to ensure that special 
school services and health insurance now recognise children with Asperger’s as 
legitimate claimants on services, and many service users identify as “aspies”. The 
proposed revisions to D.S.M.-5 were seen to threaten all that had been achieved. In the 
arguments that have followed we see how the fact that diagnoses get used in 
determining eligibility for special services and insurance has made altering the 
diagnostic criteria problematic.  The tensions around Asperger’s not only forced the 
A.P.A. to add a note to the D.S.M.-5 that allows historic D.S.M.-IV diagnoses to stand, 
but also led to proposed legislation in some States that threatens to take control over 




4.2. The failure to introduce a dimensional classification for personality disorders  
 
Our second example concerns a proposed wider scale revision: the (failed) attempt to shift 
from a categorical to a dimensional classification system for the personality disorders. The 
D.S.M.-IV is a categorical classification system.  For each disorder, diagnostic criteria are 
provided. A patient either meets or fails to meet the criteria, and is consequently said to either 
have or to not have the disorder (a yes/no decision). In contrast, on a dimensional system a 
patient is rated as having traits to a greater or lesser extent. Examples of widely-used 
dimensional classifications are the various rating scales for personality traits currently used 
by psychologists, where a person is described as being more or less extrovert, and more or 
less neurotic, for example. 
Early on in the process of revising the D.S.M. there were expectations that the new 
classification would make greater use of dimensional measures. Under the D.S.M.-IV a great 
many patients met diagnostic criteria for more than one diagnosis, while others had many 
symptoms but failed to meet criteria for any specific condition. Many came to think that such 
problems could be reduced by the use of a dimensional system (Rounsaville et al, 2002; 
Krueger et al., 2005; Widiger & Samuel, 2005). The drive towards dimensions was 
particularly strong amongst researchers working on personality disorders (First et al., 2002; 
Widiger & Simonsen, 2005b.; Widiger & Trull, 2007). Personality disorders are deep-seated 
and typically life-long patterns of maladaptive personality functioning. Antisocial personality 
disorder (characterised by “a disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others”), and 
borderline personality disorder (characterised by “instability in interpersonal relationships, 
self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity”) (A.P.A., 1994, p.629), are probably the best 
known disorders in this class. With personality disorders, even more than in other sections of 
the manual, comorbidity was a problem; the majority of patients receiving a personality 
disorder diagnosis met criteria for more than one personality disorder (Skodol et al., 2013, 
p.342). At the same time, many patients failed to meet criteria for any specific personality 
disorder, making personality disorder not otherwise specified the most common personality 
disorder diagnosis (Skodol et al., 2013, p.342).  
The idea that a dimensional approach to the personality disorders might be preferable had 
long been in the air. Allen Frances, chairman of the D.S.M.-IV (1994), had been sympathetic 
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to the idea that the personality disorders should be diagnosed using a dimensional system 
(Frances, 1993). Ultimately, however, the D.S.M.-IV ended up continuing with a purely 
categorical approach. The D.S.M.-IV personality disorder work group considered adding an 
alternative dimensional model, but concluded that clinicians would be “unlikely to accept 
added diagnostic complexity” (Gunderson, 1996 p.650). 
Between the D.S.M.-IV and the D.S.M.-5 work on dimensional approaches continued (for a 
review see Widiger & Samuel, 2005). Widiger & Simonsen (2005a) showed how the distinct 
dimensional systems that had been developed might be interpreted as having common 
factors, thus providing a way forward for one compromise system to be developed and 
included in the D.S.M.-5. Early on in the revisionary process the A.P.A. endorsed the idea 
that the personality disorders section should move to a dimensional approach (Rounsaville et 
al., 2002, p.13) and sponsored a conference to discuss ways forward for the D.S.M.-5 
(Widiger & Simonsen, 2005b.). There was massive support amongst researchers for a move 
away from the D.S.M.-IV categorical system. A study of the members of two organisations, 
the U.S.-based Association for Research on Personality Disorders and the International 
Society for the Study of Personality Disorders, surveyed personality disorder researchers and 
found that 74% thought the D.S.M.-IV categorical approach should be replaced. 80% claimed 
that personality pathology was dimensional in nature (Bernstein et al., 2007). 
However, although there was a broad consensus amongst researchers that a dimensional 
system would best classify the personality disorders, the D.S.M. is not only a classification 
for research. It has also got to be used by clinicians and administrators, and influential figures 
began to voice concerns that such users might struggle to use a dimensional system. Michael 
First was the text editor for D.S.M.-IV, and D.S.M.-IV-TR, and is an acknowledged expert on 
the details of the D.S.M.-system. He warned, 
Adopting a dimensional approach would likely complicate medical record keeping, 
create administrative and clinical barriers between mental disorders and medical 
conditions, require a massive retreating effort, disrupt research efforts (e.g., meta-
analyses), and complicate clinicians’ efforts to integrate prior clinical research using 
D.S.M. categories into clinical practice. (First, 2005, p.560) 
 
In the face of such concerns, proponents of dimensional approaches attempted to demonstrate 
that such classifications could be used in the clinic. However categorical D.S.M.-IV styles of 
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diagnosis proved so entrenched that even establishing a methodology that would fairly 
compare the usability of categorical and dimensional systems proved problematic. Studies 
tended to employ case vignettes, which clinicians classified using each of the competing 
systems. Easily available vignettes had often been developed for the purposes of teaching or 
illustrating diagnosis on the D.S.M.-IV system, and had been designed to provide information 
that fitted with D.S.M.-IV diagnostic criteria. As such, categorical approaches gained an 
unfair advantage (Samuel and Widiger, 2006, p.300). In addition, given that all clinicians 
were used to employing the categorical D.S.M.-IV approach it was hard to estimate how easy 
employing a dimensional approach would be once clinicians had become used to the new 
system. 
The idea began to be mooted that moving straight to a dimensional system in D.S.M.-5 would 
be a mistake. Although arguing that psychiatric classification should eventually come to rely 
more on dimensions, Helzer, Kraemer and Kruger (2006) suggested that “as we contemplate 
adding a dimensional component to psychiatric diagnosis to better position ourselves to 
address future needs, it is vital that we also preserve a solid bridge to the categorical 
taxonomy” (p.1678). A paper co-authored by Skodol, chair of the personality disorder work 
group concurred,  
 
 …a novel dimensional system for P.D.s in D.S.M.-V could represent an 
unnecessarily abrupt departure from the constructs described in D.S.M.-IV, some 
of which have garnered extensive clinical and research interest. Although 
implementation of dimensions in D.S.M.-V is called for by the research literature, 
this implementation will likely be more successful if it is an orderly and logical 
progression from D.S.M.-IV. (Krueger et al., 2007, p.S65) 
 
The paper goes on to suggest that work should begin on developing ways of “synthesizing 
categorical and dimensional approaches to personality disorders that could inform the 
construction of D.S.M.-V” (Krueger et al., 2007, p.S65). 
 
The DSM-5 work group on personality disorders went on to develop a hybrid model, which 
was made public as a part of the draft D.S.M.-5 published on the D.S.M.5.org web site in 
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February 2010 (described in Skodol et al. 2011).6 This model sought to maintain continuity 
with the D.S.M.-IV personality disorder categories but also to include dimensional 
components. The model “combined a dimensional severity measure, dimensional prototype 
matching for describing PD types, and ratings of pathological personality traits” (Skodol et 
al., 2013, p.344). 
The proposed system was widely condemned as overly complex (e.g. Livesley, 2010; 
Widiger, 2011; Silk, 2013, p.350,). Furthermore, the consequence of being pulled in two 
directions was that the hybrid model was neither a proper categorical system nor a proper 
dimensional system. Compared to the D.S.M.-IV, the categorical component was much 
reduced. While the D.S.M.-IV provided diagnostic criteria for ten distinct personality 
disorders; the hybrid proposal included narrative descriptions of five personality disorder 
prototypes.  A categorical system based on diagnostic criteria requires the clinician to go 
through a list of criteria one by one and see if the patient has sufficient symptoms for a 
diagnosis. A prototype matching system provides a brief description of a typical patient and 
leaves the clinician to judge whether the patient being diagnosed is sufficiently similar. 
Prototype matching is quicker than checking diagnostic criteria, but widely considered a less 
reliable system. The proposed shift to less-reliable prototypes was widely condemned (e.g. 
Livesley, 2010; Widiger, 2011), and the deletion of half the D.S.M.-IV personality disorder 
categories also met with much opposition, with critics arguing that this or that category had 
been useful and should be retained (e.g. Livesley, 2010; Widiger, 2011). The dimensional 
part of the proposed system also met with criticism. Rather than drawing on the various 
dimensional systems that had previously been developed, the desire to ensure some sort of 
continuity with the D.S.M.-IV had led the work group to develop their own unique system 
(Skodol et al., 2011).  Advocates of dimensional systems worried that there was little 
empirical support for the dimensional component of the proposals (Widiger, 2011). 
Against such criticism, and at the request of the D.S.M.-5 Task Force, a new proposal was 
developed that replaced the prototypes with sets of diagnostic criteria, and reinserted one of 
the deleted personality disorder categories (Skodol, 2012).  The dimensional component of 
the hybrid model was also revised and simplified. The basic problems, however, remained. 
The proposal was still very complex, and satisfied neither those who advocated for a 
categorical approach, nor those who preferred a dimensional approach. Gunderson (2013) 
                                                            
6
 The A.P.A. has since removed this website (although it can still be accessed via The “Wayback Machine- 
Internet Archive” by searching for  http://dsm5.org) 
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suggests that the proposed “amalgam of two systems…was too radical to offer continuity 
with the past, too conceptually incoherent, and too complex to be used clinically” (p.370).  
Ultimately the revised hybrid model failed to be approved by the A.P.A. committees that were 
responsible for overseeing the development of D.S.M.-5. The Scientific Review Committee 
was charged with reviewing each proposed revision to the D.S.M. to see if the empirical 
evidence supported the revision. Here the proposals for the personality disorders ran into 
difficulties. As the work group had proposed a substantially new approach to personality 
disorders, little data on the validity of the proposed model was available. (Skodol et al., 2013, 
pp.347-8). The committee responsible for reviewing the usability and policy implications of 
proposed revisions also had concerns. The Clinical and Public Health Committee, worried 
that the “proposed model was too complicated and unfamiliar for immediate use by 
psychiatrists” (Skodol et al., 2013, p.348).  
Finally the Board of Trustees decided that the new hybrid model should be placed in a 
D.S.M.-5 appendix of “Emerging Measures and Models” (A.P.A., 2013, p.761). Some 
members of the personality disorder work group suggest that the inclusion of the hybrid 
model in a D.S.M.-5 Appendix will facilitate further research on the model which might lead 
to its inclusion in the body of a later edition of the D.S.M. (Krueger, 2013). An alternative 
reading of the decision to include the hybrid model only in an appendix is that it was a face-
saving means of rejecting the proposal.  
In the main body of the D.S.M.-5 text, the D.S.M.-IV diagnostic criteria for the personality 
disorders have been reproduced. As previously discussed, experts in personality disorders 
generally have little affection for the D.S.M.-IV system. A member of the personality 
disorder working group condemns the D.S.M.-IV personality disorder classification as being 
“fundamentally broken” and recommends that it should not be used in the clinic or in 
research (Krueger, 2013, p.358). 
To sum up, in the personality disorders section of the D.S.M. we have a case where 
researchers near universally considered a revision to be necessary, but where the requirement 
to maintain some continuity with the past meant that desired changes could not be achieved. 





5. Overcoming lock-in 
We have seen how the D.S.M. has become locked-in. In so far as the D.S.M. aims to classify 
psychopathology so as to facilitate scientific research, this is plausibly a bad thing. As 
illustrated by the history of the D.S.M.-5 section on personality disorders, even when the 
research community agrees that the current classification is inadequate and should be 
replaced it remains. Lock-in thus results in the adoption of sub-optimal classifications.  
Through considering the ways in which the D.S.M. has become locked-in, we can see that 
rather than lock-in being merely a contingent, and unfortunate, side-effect of success, lock-in 
will always be a risk when a classification comes to be widely used. As the classification 
came to be used by more and more communities, it became embedded in more and more 
systems, and became harder and harder to revise. As users became ever more familiar with 
the D.S.M. system conceiving of shifting to anything radically different became more and 
more difficult.  
However, while the D.S.M. is currently locked-in this may change in the future. Lock-in is a 
time specific and agent-relative phenomenon. Changes that the A.P.A. was unable to make to 
the D.S.M.-5 may turn out to be possible for the some later edition of the D.S.M., or for some 
other new classification of mental disorders, possibly produced by another organisation.  
How can lock-in be overcome? In the literature on the lock-in of technologies a number of 
methods are commonly suggested: First, a central authority, for example, a government, may 
dictate a switch to a new system (Cowan and Hultén, 1996). This method of overcoming 
lock-in is best illustrated by those cases where a country switches from driving on one side of 
the road to the other. No individual driver could decide to make the switch, but the 
government has the power to make sure that everyone adopts the new standards. Second there 
are cases where an entrepreneur is so sure of the benefits of a new technology that he or she 
subsidises change-over costs, so as to break the monopoly held by the old technology 
(Liebowitz & Margolis, 1990). Thus, a company may offer special deals for “early adopters” 
of their new products. Third, it may be possible to overcome lock-in via creating a niche 
market (Cowan and Hultén, 1996); if some smallish number of users of a technology are 
sufficiently isolated then it may be possible to convert them to a new system even if most 
continue in the old ways. Edison’s first electric lighting system, for example, was installed on 
a steamship – a niche isolated from the then dominant systems of urban gas lighting 
(Utterback, 1994).  Fourth, on occasion, lock-in has been overcome because users so dislike 
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the idea of being locked-in that they employ heroic measures to shift to a new technology. 
Thus, the German municipality of Munich recently moved from Windows to Linux, in large 
part for political reasons (Dobusch, 2008). Fifth, some crisis may render continuing with the 
status quo untenable. Cowan and Gunby (1996) discuss how the development of pest 
resistance has forced a switch away from the previously locked-in practices of heavy 
pesticide use in various types of agriculture. Each of these methods can only be employed 
when the time and circumstances are right. The levers of change - legislative clout, cash, 
niches, grassroots resistance, crises – tend to be in short supply. The reason that lock-in is 
time and agent relative is because only certain agents, at certain times, have access to the 
means necessary for overcoming lock-in. 
Developments are currently underway that may come to challenge the dominance of the 
D.S.M. system. Inspired by the thought that the use of D.S.M. categories may now be holding 
back research, the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health is developing a radically different 
classification aimed at researchers. The Research Domain Criteria project (RDoC) aims “to 
define basic dimensions of functioning (such as fear circuitry or working memory) to be 
studied across multiple units of analysis, from genes to neural circuits to behavors, cutting 
across disorders as traditionally defined” (N.I.M.H., no date a.). The system relies far more 
on dimensions and is more biologically-focussed than the D.S.M. Instead of researchers 
studying groups of patients diagnosed with say schizophrenia, or P.T.S.D., they will study 
groups suffering from problems with, say, impulse control or emotional lability. 
We can see the RDoC project as aiming to break the hold of the D.S.M. on psychiatric 
classification via utilising a number of the strategies that have been used to successfully 
overcome lock-in in other settings.  As a major grant giver the N.I.M.H. is a “central 
authority”, at least as far as U.S. researchers are concerned. The N.I.M.H. has announced that 
it will expect the recipients of grants to use RDoC rather than D.S.M. (Insel, 2013). Big 
money is involved; the 2014 budget of the N.I.M.H. was $1.47 billion (N.I.M.H., no date b.). 
Second, in so far as RDoC only aims to be used by researchers, it can be understood as being 
aimed at a niche market. While researchers may move to using RDoC, the D.S.M. is still 
expected to be used in the clinic. In the future, RDoc may break the monopoly of the D.S.M., 




I have shown that path dependence has led to the D.S.M. becoming locked-in, at least for 
now, thus limiting the revisions that could be introduced for the D.S.M.-5. However, the idea 
that each edition of the D.S.M. is only provisional has played a key role in the way in which 
the classification has been developed and marketed. The D.S.M.-III was sold as “only one 
still frame in the ongoing process of attempting to better understand mental disorders” 
(A.P.A., 1980, p.12), while the D.S.M.-5 remains only “the current consensus on the evolving 
knowledge in our field” (A.P.A., 2013, p.24). The notion that each edition of the D.S.M. is 
provisional and will one day be revised in the light of future research has played a crucial role 
in ensuring its acceptance. Most mental disorders are as yet inadequately understood and 
experts commonly disagree about how they should best be diagnosed. Against a background 
of such controversies, the idea that the diagnostic criteria included in any edition can always 
be revised at a later date has played an essential role in enabling sufficient consensus amongst 
those working on revisions for an edition to be agreed. Diagnostic criteria are conceived of as 
being agreed for fifteen years or so, and no longer. My claim that the D.S.M. is currently 
locked-in challenges the idea that D.S.M. criteria can always simply be revised if at some 
later point it comes to be thought that an alternative would be preferable .  
More broadly this study demonstrates that stasis in science can be worthy of explanation; 
sometimes nothing happens for a reason. The idea that science is conservative is, of course, 
already widely known and accepted. Kuhn (1970) himself taught us that revolutionary change 
in science is costly, and undertaken only when a field is presented with crisis.  Kuhn likens 
the costs of paradigm change to those of retooling a factory. He notes that “As in 
manufacture so in science – retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that 
demands it. The significance of crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for 
retooling has arrived” (1970, p.76). This study of the problems of revising the D.S.M. 
demonstrates that even Kuhn under-estimates the difficulties that can sometimes face those 
seeking change. With the D.S.M. we have cases where research communities are willing to 
“retool” their own factory, but where this isn’t sufficient to enable change. To develop Kuhn’s 
analogy further, bringing about revisions would also have required convincing other factory 
owners, with quite disparate interests, to retool as well. And this, in the end, and for now, 






A version of this paper was presented at the “Symposium on D.S.M.-5, Innovatie en 
Stagnatie; het geval D.S.M.” Conference of the Dutch section on philosophy & psychiatry 
Leiden. June 2013, and I am very grateful for the comments of those present. I am also 
grateful for a British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship (MD120060), which funded study-leave 
enabling me to work on this paper, and to the American Psychiatric Association, which 




American Psychiatric Association (1952). Diagnostic and statistical manual: mental 
disorders. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (1968). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders. (2nd edition). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association.  
American Psychiatric Association (1980). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders. (3rd edition). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders. (3rd edition - revised). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders. (Fourth edition). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders. (Fourth edition text revision). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric 
Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (2013a). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders. (Fifth edition). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (2013b). Insurance implications of DSM-5.  Psychiatric 




Arthur, W. (1990). Positive feedbacks in the economy. Scientific American, 262, 92-99. 
 
Autism Action Network (2013) Facebook permalink. Report on Stopping the D.S.M.5 
(A1663/3044). 16 July 2013. Available at 
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=162315170489749&story_fbid=52701807401
9455 [Accessed 4 May 2014] 
 
Bernstein, D., Iscan, C., & Maser, J. (2007). Opinions of personality disorder experts 
regarding the D.S.M.-IV personality disorders classification system. Journal of Personality 
Disorders, 21, 536-551. 
 
Blashfield, R. (1984). The Classification of psychopathology: Neo-Kraepelinian and 
quantitative approaches. New York: Plenum Publishing Corporation. 
 
Blashfield, R., Keeley, J., Flanagan, E., & Miles, S. (2014). The cycle of classification: 
D.S.M.-I through D.S.M.-5. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 10, 25-51. 
 
Board of Trustees (2007). D.S.M.-V task force and work group acceptance form. Amended 
and Approved by BOT October 2007. Available at 
www.D.S.M.5.org/about/Documents/D.S.M.%20Member%20Acceptance%20Form.pdf  
[Last accessed 21 July 2013]. 
 
Bowker, G. & Star S. (2000) Sorting things out. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Choi, Y. (2008). Path dependence and the Korean alphabet. Journal of Economic Behaviour 
and Organization, 65, 185-201. 
 
Cooper, R. (2005). Classifying madness: a philosophical examination of the diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental disorders. Dordrecht: Springer. 
 
Connecticut General Assembly (2013). Amendment to An Act Concerning Health Insurance 
Coverage for Autism Spectrum Disorders. SB0102906154SDO Available at 
27 
 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/amd/S/pdf/2013SB-01029-R00SA-AMD.pdf  [Last accessed 1 
May 2014] 
 
Cowan, R. (1990). Nuclear power reactors: a study in technological lock-in. The Journal of 
Economic History, 50, 541-567. 
 
Cowan, R., and Gunby, P. (1996). Sprayed to death: path dependence, lock-in and pest 
control strategies. The Economic Journal, 106: 521-542. 
 
Cowan, R. & Hultén, S. (1996). Escaping lock-in: The case of the electric vehicle. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 53, 61-79. 
 
David, P. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review, 75, 
332-337. 
 
Decker, H. (2013). The making of D.S.M.-III. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dickerson Mayes, S., Black, A., &Tierney, C. (2013). D.S.M.-5 under-identifies PDDNOS: 
Diagnostic agreement between the D.S.M.-5, D.S.M.-IV, and checklist for autism spectrum 
disorder. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 7, 298-306. 
 
Dobusch, L. (2008). Migration discourse structures: Escaping Microsoft’s desktop path. In B. 
Russo, E. Damiani, S. Hissam, B. Lundell. G. Succi (Eds.) Open Source Development, 
Communities and Quality. (Pp. 223-235). Boston: Springer. 
 
First, M.  (2005). Clinical utility: a prerequisite for the adoption of a dimensional approach in 
D.S.M. Journal of abnormal psychology, 114, 560 - 564. 
 
First, M., Bell, C., Cuthbert, B., Krystal, J., Malison, R., Offord, D., et al. (2002). Personality 
disorders and relational disorders. In D. Kuofer, M. First & D. Regier (Eds.) A research 
agenda for D.S.M.–V. (Pp123-199). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press. 
 
Frances, A. (1993). Dimensional diagnosis of personality - Not whether, but when and which. 




Frances, A. (2013). Saving normal. New York: Harper Collins. 
Greenberg, G. (2013). The book of woe: The D.S.M. and the unmaking of psychiatry. New 
York: Blue Rider.  
 
Gunderson, J. (1996). Personality disorders. In T. Widiger, A. Frances, H. Pincus,  R. Ross, 
M. First & W. Davis (Eds.) D.S.M.-IV Sourcebook, vol. 2. (Pp.647-664) Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychiatric Association.   
Gunderson, J. (2013). Seeking clarity for future revisions of the personality disorders in 
D.S.M.-5. Personality disorders: Theory, research, and treatment, 4, 368 -376. 
Happé, F. (2011). Criteria, categories, and continua: autism and related disorders in D.S.M.-5. 
Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 50, 540-542. 
 
Helzer, J., Kraemer, H., & Krueger, R.(2006). The feasibility and need for dimensional 
psychiatric diagnoses. Psychological medicine, 36, 1671-1680. 
 
Illinois General Assembly (2013). Amendment to the the Illinois Insurance Code SB0679. 
Available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=&SessionId=84&GA=97&DocTypeI
d=SB&DocNum=0679&GAID=11&LegID=55508&SpecSess=&Session [Last accessed 1 
May 2014] 
 
Insel, T. (2013). Director’s blog: Transforming diagnosis. April 29 2013. Available at 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/transforming-diagnosis.shtml [Last accessed 4 
May 2014] 
 
Krueger, R. (2013). Personality disorders are the vanguard of the post – D.S.M.-5.0 era. 
Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 4, 355. 
 
Krueger, R., Watson, D., & Barlow, D. (2005). Introduction to the special section: toward a 





Krueger, R., Skodol, A., Livesley, W., Shrout, P., & Huang, Y. (2007). Synthesizing 
dimensional and categorical approaches to personality disorders: refining the research agenda 
for D.S.M.‐V Axis II. International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research, 16, S65-
S73. 
 
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. 2
nd
 edition, enlarged. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
Kupfer, D., First, M. & Regier D. (2002). Introduction. In D. Kupfer,  M. First & D. Regier 
(Eds.) A Research Agenda for D.S.M.-V. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Pp. xv-xxiii 
 
Kutchins, H., & Kirk, S. A. (1988). The business of diagnosis: DSM-III and clinical social 
work. Social Work, 33: 215-220. 
 
Levine, M. (2013). Pitt prof oversees psychiatric guide revision. University Times. 45, no 
page. Available at http://www.utimes.pitt.edu/?p=23893.  [Last accessed 1 May 2014]. 
 
Liebowitz, S. & Margolis, S. (1990). The fable of the keys. Journal of Law and Economics, 
33, 1-25. 
 
Livesley, W. (2010). Confusion and incoherence in the classification of personality disorder: 
Commentary on the preliminary proposals for D.S.M.-5. Psychological Injury and Law, 3, 
304-313. 
 
Matson, J., Belva, B., Horovitz, M., Kozlowski, A., & Bamburg, J. (2012). Comparing 
symptoms of autism spectrum disorders in a developmentally disabled adult population using 
the current D.S.M.-IV-TR diagnostic criteria and the proposed D.S.M.-5 diagnostic criteria. 
Journal of Developmental and Physical Disabilities, 24, 403-414.  
Mattila, M., Kielinen, M., Linna, S., Jussila, K., Ebeling, H., Bloigu, R., Joseph, R.,& 
Moilanen, I. (2011). Autism spectrum disorders according to D.S.M.-IV-TR and comparison 
30 
 
with D.S.M.-5 draft criteria: An epidemiological study. Journal of the American Academy of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. 50, 583-592.e11.  
 
Miller, L., Bergstrom, D., Cross, H., & Grube, J. (1981). Opinions and use of the D.S.M. 
system by practicing psychologists. Professional Psychology, 12, 385- 390. 
 
N.I.M.H. (no date a.) Research domain criteria. Available at 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/index.shtml [Last accessed 13 May 2014] 
 
N.I.M.H. (no date b.). FY 2014 Budget – Congressional justification. Available at 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/budget/fy-2014-budget-congressional-
justification.shtml#budgetGraphs [Last accessed 4 May 2014] 
 
No author (1988). Principles of workgroup membership selection. In D.S.M.-IV General File 
Jan-July 1988. Office of Research. In Carton 35 of 44. Archives of the American Psychiatric 
Association.  
 
Psych Practice blog (2013). Show me the science. Posted June 5 2013. Available at 
http://psychpracticemd.blogspot.co.uk/2013/06/show-me-science.html [Accessed 7 Jan 2014] 
 
Reed, G. (2010). Toward I.C.D.-11: Improving the clinical utility of WHO’s International 
Classification of Mental Disorders. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 41: 
457-464. 
 
Rounsaville, B., Alarcón, R., Andrews, G., Jackson, J., Kendell, R., & Kendler, K. (2002). 
Basic nomenclature issues for D.S.M.-V. A research agenda for D.S.M.-V, 1-29. Washington, 
D.C.: American Psychiatric Association. 
 
Samuel, D., & Widiger, T. (2006). Clinicians' judgments of clinical utility: A comparison of 
the D.S.M.-IV and five-factor models.  Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115, 298 -308. 
 
Scott, P. (2001). Path dependence and Britain’s “Coal Wagon Problem”. Explorations in 




Shorter, E. (2013). The history of D.S.M.. In J. Paris and J. Phillips (Eds.) Making the 
D.S.M.-5 (Pp. 3-19). New York: Springer. 
 
Silk, K. (2013). Caught in an unconscious split: Commentary on “The ironic fate of the 
personality disorders in D.S.M.-5”. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research and Treatment, 
4, 350-351. 
 
Skodol, A. (2012). Personality disorders in D.S.M.-5. Annual review of clinical psychology, 
8, 317-344. 
 
Skodol, A., Morey, L., Bender, D. & Oldham, J. (2013) The ironic fate of the personality 
disorders in D.S.M.-5. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research and Treatment, 4, 342-349. 
 
Skodol, A., Clark, L., Bender, D., Krueger, R., Morey, L., Verheul, R.,  et al. (2011). 
Proposed changes in personality and personality disorder assessment and diagnosis for 
D.S.M.-5. Part I: Description and rationale. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and 
Treatment, 2, 4-22. 
 
State of New York (2013). Act 3044A. An act to amend the mental hygiene law and the 
insurance law, in relation to the definition of autism and autism spectrum disorder Available 
at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/api/1.0/lrs-print/bill/S3044A-2013 [Last accessed 7 
Jan 2013] 
 
Treasurer (2012). Treasurer’s Report 2012. Available at  
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BzWdENl1wkVSYk5aXzRZelFYUjA/edit?pli=1 [Last 
accessed 5 May 2014] 
 
Utterback, J. (1996). Mastering the dynamics of innovation. Harvard Business Press. 
 
Widiger, T. (2011). A shaky future for personality disorders. Personality Disorders: Theory, 




Widiger, T. & Samuel, D. (2005). Diagnostic categories or dimensions? A question for the 
Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. .Journal of abnormal psychology, 114, 
494 - 504. 
 
Widiger, T., & Simonsen, E. (2005a). Alternative dimensional models of personality 
disorder: Finding a common ground. Journal of personality disorders, 19, 110-130. 
 
Widiger, T., & Simonsen, E. (2005b). Introduction to the special section: The American 
Psychiatric Association's research agenda for the D.S.M.–V. Journal of Personality 
Disorders, 19, 103-109. 
 
Widiger, T., & Trull, T. (2007). Plate tectonics in the classification of personality disorder: 
shifting to a dimensional model. American Psychologist, 62, 71-83. 
 
 
